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Self-Overcoming in Foucault's

Discipline and Punish

LADELLE McWHORTER

Prisons are veritable universities of crime. Within them young offenders
learn both the values and the techniques of hardened criminals. In addition to these lessons in professional ethics and theory, aspiring criminals
also get hands-on experience within prison walls, for prisons are also
centers of criminal activity: drug and arms trafficking, rape, gang warfare, and murder. And, like all good universities, prisons help their proteges make the contacts they need to further their budding careers.
Few will disagree that our prison system, along with its subsidiary
mechanisms, produces the conditions under which delinquency can spread
and flourish. But Michel Foucault's assertion in Discipline and Punish is
far stronger than that. Foucault is not just reiterating the familiar claim
that prisons produce a medium for the development of delinquency, rather,
he is claiming that our disciplinary society actually produces the delinquent self in its very being.
It is said that the prison fabricated delinquents; it is true that it brings
back, almost inevitably, before the courts those who have been sent
there. But it also fabricates them in the sense that it has introduced into
the operation of the law and the offence, the judge and the offender, the
condemned man and the executioner, the non-corporeal reality of the
delinquency that links them together and, for a century and a half, has
caught them in the same trap. 1
Delinquency itself-as a functional locus within a discourse but also as a
possible form of selfhood, as a way of being, as a way of being known
and of knowing oneself-arose simultaneously with and is sustained and
33
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perpetuated by what Foucault calls the carceral system. Delinquency and
the prison system are the twin offspring of the same series of events, the
same movement of power.
Foucault offers two sorts of evidence for his assertion that the very
being of the delinquent is a product of a certain series of events within a
network of power. First, he notes the lack of the figure of the delinquent
prior to the dramatic rise in the use of incarceration as a form of punishment in Western Europe. Before the advent of prison systems with their
internal hierarchies and structures of correction and their attendant psychiatric and medical knowledges and practices, legal proceedings and
techniques of punishment focused primarily on an act or series of acts.
Criminality was merely a matter of action, not a state of being, and punishment was its counteraction. But as a carceral system develops, we find
that the central focus of judicial administration is not action, but rather
self, the true being of the one who acts offensively. Actions are considered only insofar as they function to initiate contact between the delinquent and the correctional system and insofar as they are understood to be
the true expression of an underlying reality. Delinquency functions as the
name of that reality.
In addition to delinquency's absence prior to the widespread use of
imprisonment to punish offenders, Foucault offers another piece of evidence to support his notion that delinquency is produced within a certain
configuration of power relations. He points out how very useful delinquency is and, as a result, how very invested in its existence certain
mechanisms of power are.
Delinquency is indirectly useful because it represents such an improvement over popular, sporadic unlawfulness. The existence of a class
of people who claim illegality as their own prerogative necessarily limits
the unlawful activity of the general population. Once delinquency was
defined and reified, a sorting process could occur. Delinquents, unlike
sporadically rowdy citizens, could be identified, watched, and managed.
Delinquency also has its direct uses. Occasionally delinquents have
been used as a population and labor force to colonize conquered territories. More often, they have been used as a sort of covert labor force at
home, available for employment by legitimate private businesses or
various state agencies to work on the fringes of legality-as smugglers,
prostitutes, odds-makers, informants, and spies. A prominent example
from recent history of the direct use of delinquency by a legitimate
agency is the C.I.A.'s employment of General Manuel Noriega and his
underlings in Central America. But we need not look to the sensational
case for corroboration of Foucault's claim. We need only consider how
often prostitutes are used in the negotiation of business deals or petty
thugs are employed by collection agencies. Delinquents perform valued
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services that result in power and profits for people whose own reputations are clean.
Delinquents are not only legally marginal laborers; they are also
auxiliary police. Crime normalizes. Crime in the ghettos keeps racial and
ethnic minorities frightened and disorganized; thus they cannot effectively challenge the oppression perpetrated against them by dominant social groups. The existence of thugs and thieves who confine themselves
primarily to ethnic and working class neighborhoods helps to determine
property values and thereby ensures continued segregation by race and
class. Rapists help keep women in our "place" by literally curtailing our
activities and by making us feel dependent upon the protection of men. 2
But beyond their use as terrorists, hitmen, spies, or informants, delinquents perform another service. They serve as objects of knowledge.
Foucault writes, "in fabricating delinquency, it [disciplinary power] gave
to criminal justice a unitary field of objects, authenticated by the 'sciences,' and thus enabled it to function on a general horizon of 'truth"'
(DP 256). In other words, certain knowledges themselves, namely the
human sciences, have a direct interest in the fabrication and continued
existence of their object of study, the delinquent individual.
Delinquents are so very useful, it would seem, that if they did not
already exist, society would have had to invent them. Indeed, that is just
Foucault's point. Foucault's target for destabilization in Discipline and
Punish, however, it not just our carceral system. The trap is set for much
bigger prey.
Enter the will to truth. If Foucault is right, we may say in outrage,
then a terrible thing has occurred: people have been victimized by disciplinary powers that have created false identities for them. Whatever their
"real" truth, young men and women have been prodded, pressed, and
brainwashed into behaving like criminals and even into believing that
criminality formed the core of their very souls. Delinquency does not
exist, but for a century and a half we have all been made to believe that it
does and to act accordingly, with disastrous results. Something must be
done.
Let us consider this outrage and the assumptions that underlie and
drive it. The first important assumption is that fundamentally humanity
occurs as individuals, each with his or her own true core identity that is
untouched by power except a posteriori and negatively. The second important assumption, which is interrelated with the first, is that power is
antithetical to truth; this leads to the conclusion that we must be suspicious of any claim to truth if it is clear that the claim is in the interest of
some power.
As bearers of a classical liberal legacy, we are predisposed to assume that whatever is traversed by power is also corrupted by it. Power,
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we tend to believe, distorts truth. If an event, a thing, or a way of being
human cannot be separated from functions of power, then we feel fairly
certain that we are not in possession of truth with regard to that event,
thing, or person. Therefore, if we become persuaded that delinquency is
thoroughly permeated by power, we tend to lose faith in its reality. While
reading Discipline and Punish, then, we may begin to suspect that the
truth of the individuals treated as delinquents has been lost completely
beneath a truthless discursive overlay. Delinquents are not really delinquents, rather they are victims of oppression.
That view, however, is not likely to appeal to those of us who have
known delinquents, attended school with them, worked with them, or
have had blood ties with them. At times, some may seem to be victims of
a system that casts them into a role in violation of their own natures. But
more frequently, delinquents do not seem like victims except perhaps in
some very abstract, theoretical sense; they seem, instead, like people who
choose to live as they do just as nondelinquents choose to live as they do.
And that, given our tendency to see power as a violation of truth,
should come as a fairly disturbing thought. For it implies this: either we
are all victims of oppressive forces and our truth is hidden from us perhaps irrevocably, or delinquents are real beings, true beings fabricated by
power.
The text pursues the latter possibility. The very being of the delinquent is a matter of production, it asserts. Furthermore, delinquency is not
the only form of selfhood that may be analyzed as a production of disciplinary regimes. There is also the soldier, the factory worker, the schoolchild, and, the text insinuates, the family member. These beings, these
persons, also are produced through disciplinary mechanisms. These ways
of being selves are also invested and contoured by networks of power.
Delinquency is far from a singular occurrence. In fact, Foucault asserts,
"[t]his book is intended as a correlative history of the modern soul ... "
(DP 23). Not just delinquents, but everyone is placed in question here.
Discipline and Punish is not a discourse about what is external to its
readers and author; it is a discourse whose movement encompasses and
places in question every one of us.
The first prospect was unsettling enough: that perhaps we are all so
traversed-in even the most ordinary, most intimate or characteristic expressions of ourselves-by normalizing disciplinary power that we are all
ignorant of our own truth, that all our efforts to know ourselves are
illusory failures. But the second prospect, that the "truth" of the individual may in fact just be configurations of power, is far more unsettling.
For how is the will to truth to appropriate and conform itself to the
"truth" that there is no stable, unitary truth of the individual human soul
apart from historical, productive power? We would, perhaps, rather place
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our hope on the first prospect and assume that we just do not have the
real truth about ourselves. As Foucault's text unfolds, however, the second prospect takes on greater and greater plausibility. We are forced, by
the power of our own desire for truth, to open our thinking to the possibility that the human individual may itself be a historical event, a product
of power relations. We will follow this thought's unfolding through the
rest of this chapter.
First of all, we willing self-knowers might ask, how could a disciplinary regime create individuality? Foucault offers a careful and convincing analysis. He suggests three mutually reinforcing modes of
production of individuality: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the technique of the examination.
First we see a shift in architecture. Buildings are to function as
machines in which observation may take place, for observation in itself
becomes a means of control. Hospitals become machines for controlling
contagion, and thus the conduct of those infected. Factories become machines for controlling production by controlling the laborers within them.
Schools become machines for controlling the development of children.
The form of power that invests these architectural apparatuses is not modeled after the top to bottom power of a sovereign king; power comes to
function within these institutions automatically, anonymously, and continuously. "Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power
that sustains itself by its own mechanisms and which, for the spectacle of
public events, substitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes" (DP
177). A network of power is formed in which a certain set of spaces are
marked out, across which human beings are distributed. One is identified
by the space one occupies, and one is kept in that space and brought into
conformity with that identity through the subtly physical, though
noncorporeal, method of constant ordered observation.
Observation is closely related to normalization. Observation of persons makes possible a ranking system in which persons are compared to
one another and to a set of standards. Deviation from the standards or
failure to progress upward through the established ranks in the allotted
time is grounds for punishment. Once such a system is in place and
functioning, however, the sort of punishment it offers is simply its own
reassertion. The schoolboy who fails to remember his catechism is punished by being lowered in class rank. The norm or standard that the child
must attain spreads itself out both spatially and temporally in terms of
gradations, expectations for progress, and physical location so that the
child who fails does not violate the normalizing system or escape it, but
merely remains within it, demoted, marked by its judgment. The disciplinary technique of normalization not only defines the good, the right, or
the proper, but also the bad, the wrong, and the improper all on a long
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continuum of gradation from which there is no escape. There is no outside to normalizing networks, and there is no gap in them, only a gapless
series of ranks. Within such a network every stage of development, every
possible state of being, can be identified.
Finally, "the examination combines the techniques of an observing
hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment" (DP 184). Examination is
the technique of differentiation; it is the mechanism for distribution of
persons across a graded and gapless continuum. "In this space of domination, disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging
objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification" (DP 187). Most significant, it is the examination that first inserts the
patient, the schoolchild, the soldier, or the prisoner into a system of
writing. Records must be kept of the course of disease, of the progress of
training, or of rehabilitation.
Thanks to the whole apparatus of writing that accompanies it, the examination opened up two correlative possibilities: firstly, the constitution of the individual as a describable, analyzable object, not in order to
reduce him to "specific" features, as did the naturalists in relation to
living things, but in order to maintain him in his individual features, in
his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes or abilities, under the gaze
of a permanent corpus of knowledge; and, secondly, the constitution of a
comparative system that made possible the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization of collective
facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their distribution
in a given "population." (DP 190)
Thus each human being, thoroughly individualized and maintained in his
or her individuality, becomes a "case." He or she is both an object of
knowledge and an identifiable, locatable target for power. The individual
"may be described, judged, measured, compared with others" (DP 191 ).
And, at the same time, the individual may "be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc." (DP 191).
Prior to the establishment of disciplinary power, only heroes-kings,
generals, or saints-were marked out as individuals whose lives might be
documented and who might feel themselves to be unique. Within disciplinary regimes, however, individuality is created and enforced for all
persons. Self-identity is produced and persons are fixed by it, unable to
transgress it. Within disciplinary systems, each person is observed, examined, judged, and documented in his or her precise degree of deviation
from the norm. Thus individuality just is deviance. To be an individual
just is to occupy a particular place with regard to a set of norms and to
own a history of such particular occupations in a documented order. As
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such, individuality can exist only within a network of power relations
wherein norms and hierarchies are strictly maintained. The modern individual is a creation of disciplinary techniques.
This point cannot be overstressed because our inclination will be to
disregard its significance. Our own will to truth, the will that informs us in
our very being, will insist upon its own object, its raison d'etre: a true selfidentical core of being analytically separable from and logically prior to
power. Taking Foucault seriously, then, when he suggests that such an a priori
self-identical core does not exist, will threaten that will's very existence.
Insofar as we are that will to truth, if we find ourselves thinking
within the plausibility of Foucault's account of individuality, we will attempt to think the historicity of individuality as the "truth" of the individual. That move will probably occur as follows. First, we will assume
that individuals exist self-identically through time. Then we will assume
that the ahistorical truth of ourselves as individuals is that we were fabricated within power mechanisms and are sustained by them. We will discipline ourselves to that truth, attempt to force ourselves to identify with
that truth, to become that truth, to "own" it. The real truth of individual
selfhood, we will say, is that it cannot be understood separately from
power. We will, however, maintain the reality of that truth apart from
power and thus we will fail to place in question truth itself, the notion
that there are stable identities that can be known apart from any context
of valuation, of power.
Such a move, however, will only end in frustration because within
Foucault's discourse it will not bring us to stable ground. Once we realize
that the movement toward self-identical individuality is itself the move of
a disciplinary regime, we must also realize that to insist that the true
identity of individuality is its historicity and its location within a power
regime is simply to replicate that disciplinary power. Any insistence on a
stable identity for a human self, whether that stable identity is the identity
of the delinquent or the identity of a power-traversed historical subjectivity, is a move undertaken from within disciplinary power and not in violation of it. In other words, this new claim to truth-that the individual is a
creation of power-is not innocent of power. On its own terms, it is a
self-violating claim.
Thus the text disrupts our move to reinstate the notion of a truth
dissociated from power and refuses to allow us to leave unquestioned the
notion that power and truth are mutually repulsive. Perhaps, Foucault
writes,
we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that
knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and
that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands
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and its interests. Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power
makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is
one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power
produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it is
useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there
is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute
at the same time power relations. (DP 27)
We are not, so this text tells us, going to find a truth of our selves that is
free of networks of power. Even the truth that we are not going to find a
truth of our selves that is free of networks of power is not free of these
networks.
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in
negative terms: it 'excludes,' it 'represses,' it 'censors,' it 'abstracts,' it
'masks,' it 'conceals.' In fact, power produces; it produces reality;
it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and
the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.
(DP 194)
For centuries we Westerners believed that we must come to know
ourselves in our ownmost truth. Only thus can we be saved; only thus can
we be mentally healthy; only thus can we battle the powers of oppression
that surround us in the gathering darkness. Foucault's discourse places in
question our belief that there is a true self, apart from historical power
networks, that we can come to know. But worse, his discourse places in
question our drive to know. Our will to truth, to the truth of ourselves,
maintains itself by asserting that there is a truth toward which it strives.
In the absence of such a truth, the will to truth-which to a great extent is
what we are-cannot remain in being.
Within the unfolding of Foucault's discourse, as we have said, the
will to truth will attempt to maintain itself by asserting that the truth of
self is power. But that assertion cannot maintain its own stability, for
what it amounts to is an assertion that the pure core of self-identity simply is impurely self-identical, precisely because it is an a posteriori construction of power.
Furthermore, the drive to identify has already been exposed as a
disciplinary drive, not a Galahadesque search for pure self undertaken in
purity. To remain what it is, however, to maintain itself in its own identity, the drive to know, the will to truth cannot own itself as power; it
cannot own its own creativity, nor can it own its own interestedness. If
the "truth" of the will to truth is its affinity with what it has named
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untruth, then it is disrupted in its movement, since it is forced, compelled
by its own energy, to accept as truth that it has no truth.
This, of course, is a paradox. It amounts to perpetual violation,
disruption, and frustration of the drive to know. Foucault's discourse is
the labyrinth in which the will to truth is led to turn against itself. It is a
movement that folds back upon what moves it. It is the energy of our will
to know folding back over upon itself-again and again and again. The
text's movement is the will to truth turning against, over, and through
itself. The text is fundamentally self-violating and self-overcoming, not
just because it destabilizes the notion of self, but, more important, because it places in question the very power of the text itself. It is the text
qua text that is undergoing destabilization within the text.
The thesis of this chapter is that self-overcoming is not simply to be
looked for, to be located and analyzed, within Foucault's texts, but rather
that Foucault's texts may be read as self-overcomings, as pure motion, as
overcoming-occurring. Foucault's discourse runs counter to power and
instigates the overcoming of certain structures of power, for example, the
ascetic self; but Foucault's discourse also is power, and its truth is contingent upon and supportive of that power. Thus it is a discourse that bares
its neck before its own analytic knife; it is a discourse that embraces its
own mortality. In its agitative action it dissolves itself. It is a discourse
that, in proper-that is, in perverse-Nietzschean fashion, ends by biting
its own tail-simultaneously, of course, swallowing in advance any commentary that would claim to have offered a true account of the selfovercoming movement it manifests.

